

Apologetics for this Secular Age

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Introduction

Apologetics addresses the challenges posed in its day. Paul's address on Mars Hill recorded in Acts 17 was clearly attuned to the mindset and life's experience of his audience. Not too long after, Christians found themselves having to answer charges related to their behavior as citizens of Rome. They took up philosophical challenges and challenges coming from Jews and later from Muslims. In the Enlightenment era they took up the challenges of rationalism and issues raised by science. Today there are the additional problems of language and the possibility of knowing truth among other things. And along the way, Christians have sought not only to provide sound answers to specific challenges but to present persuasive cases for belief.

Not only do apologists have to be aware of the questions but also of the underlying worldview beliefs that shape people's understandings. In today's secular climate, challenges arise typically in the context of what Charles Taylor calls the *immanent frame*, the background picture of reality that is undefined (perhaps purposefully) but which contains, for example, a belief in exclusive or self-sufficing humanism. This is the idea that there are "no final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing. Of no previous society," Taylor says, "was this true."¹

The thesis of my paper is this. The modern secularist has a particular set of assumptions that form a wall which makes belief difficult. Upon these assumptions are constructed arguments that presuppose them that serve to strengthen the wall. Our engagement with secularists is often

characterized by little more than a clash of ideas; our arguments seem to just ricochet off the wall. It would be helpful, I believe, if we could find an approach that brings God's truths to light that the secularist cannot deny, or cannot deny easily. The purpose for this isn't ultimately to find a quicker and more powerful way to best the opponent in debate. It is to bring him or her face to face with the claims of Jesus Christ. What the person is in himself is the best place to find such things.

This secular age

To give a brief sketch of the character of our times, I'll draw from Taylor's *A Secular Age*, a book which sociologist José Casanova calls "the best analytical, phenomenological, and genealogical account we have of our modern, secular condition."² My extremely brief look at Taylor's work won't begin to do justice to his argument; I merely want to highlight a few of the characteristics of our secular age he describes.

Taylor names three kinds of secularization: the differentiation between civil and ecclesiastical structures; the falling off of religious belief and practice; and the shift in what Taylor calls the "conditions of belief." Secularization in the last sense refers to the shift from a context in which belief in God was natural and unchallenged to one where belief is but one option among many and not the easy option at that. It is that shift which is the theme of Taylor's book.

Religious belief was for all practical purposes unavoidable five hundred years ago in the West.³ Religion encompassed the sense that there is some good beyond human flourishing, a belief in a higher power, and the ability to see our lives as extending beyond this earthly life. In Christianity, this good which is beyond human flourishing is the love of God which can

transform us and lift us beyond that of which we're humanly capable. The issue of human flourishing played a crucial role in the shift to exclusive humanism.

Through a long historical process, Western man's view of the world was changed in several important ways. Taylor rejects what he calls the "subtraction stories" offered by secularists according to which their beliefs about life and the world were the natural result of the loss or the deliberate sloughing off of religious belief. Religion had impeded human flourishing, it was said, and it was right and good that it be set aside.

Taylor tells the story of this change in terms of a few broad features: disenchantment, the attempt to erase certain social tensions, a change in the concept of time, and the replacing of cosmos with universe. I'll comment on these only briefly.

Disenchantment

The enchanted world was one in which the spiritual world, made up of spirits and demons and moral forces, impinged on human experience both for good and ill. These forces formed a meaningful world outside the human mind, but not simply outside. This world of meaning formed a space within which people lived. In an enchanted world, meanings are not just inside our minds. There is meaning outside us which straddles boundaries. The boundary between inside and outside is porous.⁴

By contrast, in a disenchanted world, we are not porous but buffered. Our interior self, our mind, is shielded from the outside world. "For the modern, buffered self," Taylor says, "the possibility exists of taking a distance from, disengaging from everything outside the mind. My ultimate purposes are those which arise within me, the crucial meanings for things are those defined in my responses to them."⁵ Taylor notes that the buffered self doesn't *have* to see itself

as so shielded from the outside, but the option is there. Disbelief isn't necessary, but it's now possible.

Social changes

The second feature is the contributions of social structures to one's sense of God.

The porous self was part of a larger world. Being part of a larger social group means we are accountable to others. Before modern times, one's social group had access to external powers; "society itself is seen, is experienced as a locus of this power."⁶ Society itself becomes an argument for God. By contrast, the buffered self can see itself simply as an individual. "The buffered self is essentially the self which is aware of the possibility of disengagement. And disengagement is frequently carried out in relation to one's whole surroundings, natural and social."⁷

But in an enchanted world, one feels a pull in two directions: in the direction of transcendence, and in the direction of human fulfillment or flourishing. Society itself divides into two groups: those whose attention is fully on the desires of God—the monks, for example—and those whose time is spent mostly dealing with the cares of this world. The codes of life were different for these groups, but there was a kind of equilibrium between the two. In time the élite became dissatisfied with this separation and worked to draw the masses up to the level of the renunciative order primarily through setting higher standards. It was "an effort to align the masses on the religion of the élites."⁸ Taylor calls this a "rage for order."⁹ His description of the process is quite involved and I won't try to fill in details. Suffice it to say that the goal was the flattening out of society with a uniform code which governed all. This flattening out wasn't highly successful, though, but I'll leave it to the reader to gather those details.

Time

The change in the concept of time was also important in the shift to exclusive humanism. Taylor distinguishes between ordinary or secular time and higher time. Secular time is the chronological time in which we live. One thing happens after another happens after another. “Higher times gather and re-order secular time,” Taylor writes. A multitude of events in secular time are combined in God’s time as a moment. Taylor uses the imagery of a song which, while taking a certain amount of ordinary time, still combines into a moment of time on a higher level; the first note of the song requires the last note to complete it, and the last note is meaningless without what precedes. “This creates a kind of simultaneity between the components of an action,” he says.¹⁰

Higher time gave meaning to ordinary time which it did not contain itself. “The tracts of secular time were not homogeneous, mutually interchangeable. They were coloured by their placing in relation to higher times.” The modern view of time, by contrast, sees it as a container like space, “indifferent to what fills it.”¹¹ Homogeneity of time isn’t the only possibility in modern times, but it is the most common view. Of course, those who believe God is real and active in this world can see things otherwise, but for secular man apart from God, the ticking clock forms an inescapable boundary. It is Weber’s “iron cage.”¹² Our lives are governed more by the sense of lost time than by a sense of the possibilities of the moment in God’s time.

From Cosmos to Universe

Along with a conception of time as merely a succession of seconds, minutes, hours which established an ordered environment for human life, developed a similarly ordered understanding of the universe. Formerly we lived in a cosmos which had an order that was meaningful for humans, to which we were attuned and which shaped our lives. In the Christian view, God

operates through the cosmos. The combination of higher time and a cosmos as home means that “we come to see ourselves as situated in a defined history, which unfolds within a bounded setting. So the whole sweep of cosmic-divine history can be rendered in the stained glass of a large cathedral.”¹³

But now we have moved “from living in a cosmos to being included in a universe.”¹⁴ A universe is orderly but not in the same sense as a cosmos. The order of a universe is stripped of meaning; it works according to “exceptionless natural laws.”¹⁵

More than that, since the world outside is no longer seen as containing its own charged meanings, it becomes manageable for us. It operates according to laws we can understand and depend on.

The Immanent Frame

These and other factors worked together over history to bring us to where we are today. The buffered self, tuned into what it can control by its own mind, learns to develop discipline and self-control. It sees itself as an individual which can disengage from others. Social orders are not established by God but by us and for the purpose of our own good. As an individual, modern man or woman is responsible to shape his or her own life and to serve in the process with others seeking the same good. An instrumental rationalism develops to enable the fulfillment of that goal.

Taylor summarizes this way: “The buffered identity of the disciplined individual moves in a constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, and time is pervasively secular. All of this makes up what I want to call ‘the immanent frame’.”¹⁶

The immanent frame is like what Wittgenstein called a *picture*, “a background to our thinking, within whose terms it is carried on, but which is often largely unformulated, and to

which we can frequently, just for this reason, imagine no alternative. . . . We can sometimes be completely captured by the picture, not even able to imagine what an alternative would look like; or we can be in somewhat better shape: capable of seeing that there is another way of construing things, but still having great difficulty making sense of it.”¹⁷

Living within this immanent frame doesn’t necessarily result in irreligion or atheism. The frame can be either open or closed. One can live within this frame in a way that is open to something beyond, or one can assume there *is* nothing beyond; the frame is closed.

Secularists who bring the greatest direct challenges to religious belief accept the closed frame as a settled matter. There isn’t anything beyond it no matter what religious people want to believe. Taylor describes this way of thinking:

We can come to see the growth of civilization, or modernity, as synonymous with the laying out of a closed immanent frame; within this civilized values develop, and a single-minded focus on the human good, aided by the fuller and fuller use of scientific reason, permits the greatest flourishing possible of human beings. Religion not only menaces these goals with its fanaticism, but it also undercuts reason, which comes to be seen as rigorously requiring scientific materialism.¹⁸

Some people find themselves in the place William James spoke of where they are pulled in both directions; they feel the force of both and don’t know which way to go. “They cannot make any sense of the good as they experience it without reference to the transcendent in some form.”¹⁹ And obviously there are still plenty of religious people living in this secular age.

In either case, however, living in the immanent frame puts an end to naïve belief in the transcendent. Such belief doesn’t come naturally as it did centuries ago; it must be deliberately chosen, and often in opposition to ideas and institutions which resist it.²⁰

Taylor makes the interesting claim that the choice we make whether to see the frame as open or closed isn't really based on reason. "Going one way or another requires what is often called a 'leap of faith'," he writes.²¹ He defines this leap as "anticipatory confidence," a hunch that leaps ahead of the reasons we have for believing. When the ardent secularist claims that the immanent frame is closed, he is taking a step of faith. Even if evidence seems to support that conclusion, that conclusion isn't obviously true.

What moves us in one direction or the other? The secularist might like to believe that his conviction about a closed frame comes through a reasoned look at the facts, but Taylor argues that the choice is a moral one. The immanent frame forms a kind of story about the way things are which must be accepted on pain of remaining childish in one's thinking. The religious person is simply pusillanimous, incapable of dealing with the real world on an adult level. By contrast, "the unbeliever has the courage to take up an adult stance, and face reality. He knows that human beings are on their own. But this doesn't cause him just to cave in. On the contrary, he determines to affirm human worth, and the human good, and to work for it, without false illusion or consolation."²² The purported reason for believing all this is that the facts speak for themselves. Science especially has shown us the real nature of the world. Taylor insists, however, that this isn't the real story. "The real power that the package has to attract and convince lies in it as a definition of our ethical predicament, in particular, as beings capable of forming beliefs."²³ Modern man finds this ideal very attractive. But there is no real bowing to brute facts, Taylor continues. "Rather we might say that one moral outlook gave way to another."²⁴

Apologetics for this secular age

There is a lot to think about in Taylor's work, but two things stand out for my purposes. First is the subtraction theory of modernization whereby religion naturally falls away in the progress of human growth. This is another way of expressing classical secularization theory.²⁵

Second, I'm thinking about the person who lives within this immanent frame and has little or no awareness that another reading of the world is possible even if desiring that there be something else. How can such a person be put in the place where he or she can see something different?

One of the defining marks of secularists is their disengagement of mind from world which cuts them off from significant aspects of God's revelation of Himself. In doing so, man sunders himself. If such sundering is artificial, signs of artificiality should be apparent, or, at least, attempts to make up the deficiency.

Secular persons in this secular age

When we engage in apologetics in the West, we can be guaranteed that the factors discussed above play a part in our hearers' receptivity. Some will employ challenges we've heard many times:

- Christianity is outdated; it's anti-modern; it belongs to a primitive age.
- Atheism is the default position. This is supported by such things as Clifford's dictum.
- Religion is oppressive and violent.
- Religion is a private affair. It isn't for the public square.
- The presence of real evil proves there's no loving, all-powerful God.

These beliefs may be fairly well thought out, but often they've just been overheard. Not everyone we talk with will have a collection of arguments at the ready. In fact, most people in

America are probably open in Taylor's sense. Open or closed, however, they are bound to be significantly influenced by the background picture of the immanent frame, and arguments such as those above play in the backs of their minds.

In what follows, I want to first address the issue of modernization and secularization which is assumed to be settled by many who consider the frame closed. Then I'll briefly describe a way of addressing secularists in general.

A response to the closed immanent frame

How do we respond to the person who sees the frame as closed? The person might have arguments *against* the existence of God or *for* naturalism. If so we should address them. If, however, the objection is simply that religion has no place in the modern world, that it is at best useless and at worst harmful, we have the wonderful opportunity to inform the person (without gloating) that he isn't up to the latest in scholarship (or with the real currents in the world). A number of respected sociologists of religion are now convinced that the secularization thesis has no merit.

Secularization has several meanings, beginning (historically) with the practice of monks moving out of the monastery and into the stream of everyday life, then moving to the differentiation of civil and ecclesiastical institutions with all the changes that meant with respect to authority in individuals' lives. As religious authority diminished in the differentiated society, belief started to become privatized. For many people, religion began to lose pride of place in their personal lives as well; religious belief and practice diminished.

All these things have happened and are happening, most notably in Europe, but also in the US. A significant problem with the secularization thesis was that a matter of *history* was allowed to become one of *theory*. What happened in Europe was assumed to be the norm. America, by

contrast, being both secular and religious, was considered an exception to the rule. Is Europe the norm in its deep secularization and America the exception? Or, given the religious movements around the world today, is European secularism the global exception? Some say yes. Casanova says no, but this is because he believes that there *is* no global norm.

There are a number of reasons for rejecting the classical secularization thesis. The theory of multiple modernities espoused by sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt is one example. Eisenstadt notes how modernity has developed all around the world:

Modernity first moved beyond the West into different Asian societies—Japan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia—to the Middle Eastern countries, coming finally to Africa. By the end of the twentieth century, it encompassed nearly the entire world, the first true wave of globalization.²⁶

People so often tie modernity to the rise of science. Science played a crucial role, but there were deeper issues involved. Eisenstadt notes that “central to this cultural program [of modernization] was an emphasis on the autonomy of man: his or her . . . emancipation from the fetters of traditional political and cultural authority.” There was “a growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests [which] as a consequence allowed for multiple interpretations of the common good.”²⁷ The secularist construal of modernity, it turns out, isn’t the only possibility.

Peter Berger, a prominent sociologist of religion who once espoused secularization theory, now rejects it. He says that modernization has brought about secularization to some extent. But he also notes that modernization “has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization.”²⁸

Casanova references Taylor's description of the development of European secularization as involving a "stadial consciousness." It is seen as a gradual "process of maturation and growth, as a 'coming of age' and as progressive emancipation," as a state of having overcome irrational belief. But there's a problem with universalizing this experience. Casanova writes,

It is, in my view, the presence or absence of this secularist historical stadial consciousness that explains when and where processes of modernization are accompanied by radical secularization. In places where such secularist historical stadial consciousness is absent or less dominant, as in the United States or in most non-Western post-colonial societies, processes of modernization are unlikely to be accompanied by processes of religious decline. On the contrary, they may be accompanied by processes of religious revival.²⁹

An interesting example of that today is the religious experimentation of young people in Europe in countries where the state churches have lost their authority. The results might not be what Christians would like to see, but it has come as a real surprise to many. There isn't the wholesale triumph of secular rationalism that was expected.³⁰

As it turns out, there really wasn't enough empirical evidence to substantiate a general theory like classical secularization theory. For secularists to claim a society isn't truly modern insofar as religious belief plays a significant role is mere bias. If secularists are going to reject religious belief, it will have to be on some other basis.

Burrowing beneath the wall

A survey of contemporary thinking about secularization theory may seem to be superfluous in a paper on reaching secularists, especially given the direction I will take below. Earlier I expressed an interest in taking a direction away from the typical clash of ideas. The point of the foregoing review was simply to provide a basic response to the secularist who

defends the obvious superiority of his secularism based upon the inevitability of secularization in the modern world. “This is how progress works” isn’t a historically or philosophically sustainable belief.

Apart from or in addition to making such a claim the individual might turn to the familiar set of arguments set up against the knowledge of God. How might we respond to avoid what so often amounts to a logjam of ideas?

In so much of our apologetics, we find ourselves countering fact with fact, argument with argument, in our interaction with people who have given the matter a bit of thought. What about the average person in America? This person has grown up in the context of the immanent frame but hasn’t consciously constructed a case to defend it. The frame forms a kind of barrier to the person, although most likely he or she is completely unaware of it. Such people are likely to be open to things of God. However, this openness can’t help but be influenced by all that is opposed to belief today. It may be thought that so many good arguments have been made by others against belief that there isn’t much left to hope for.

I want to suggest that there is a way to do apologetics that is of value for both groups of people. This isn’t intended to be a replacement for all other methods. In fact, what I’m suggesting is already being done by some. I simply want to throw a light on it for our consideration or reconsideration.

What I want to do is suggest is that, rather than running again and again into a wall of arguments and prejudices that are quite frankly remote from the actual person, we should consider going right to the core issues of the individual’s life that cannot so easily be held at arm’s length. We might attempt to burrow beneath the various arguments by addressing realities we believe the person knows deep down even if he or she doesn’t consciously recognize them or

be willing to admit if they are recognized. This approach doesn't avoid the mind. Neither does it avoid answering questions and objections presented. It attempts to get past the endless debate that can result when we simply battle idea vs. idea, worldview vs. worldview, by going to the heart. And by "heart" I don't mean an appeal to the emotions; I mean appealing to the core of the person who was, whether he likes the idea or not, created by God and bears marks of that creation in his own person.

J.P Moreland drew attention to the importance of the image of God with the publication of his recent book, *The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism*. Moreland opens by noting concerns about the damage done to the concept of the nature of persons by naturalistic philosophy. After reviewing comments to this effect by Francis Schaeffer, Pope John Paul II, philosopher John Searle, sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, and historian Christopher Lasch, he states the importance of it for our purposes succinctly:

If Christianity is true, then certain features should characterize human beings. Those features do, in fact, characterize human beings. Thus, these features provide a degree of confirmation for Christianity. . . . The Christian offers a challenge to other worldviews—particularly naturalism: Show that you have a better explanation for these features than Christianity does (with its doctrine of the image of God), or show that these features are not actually real, even though they seem to be.³¹

Points of contact connected with the imago Dei can include both the characteristics of God that we bear in our persons and the effects of our broken relationship with Him. Moreland names a few of the first kind:

As image-bearers, human beings have all those endowments necessary to re-present and be representative of God, and to accomplish the tasks placed before them and exhibit the

relationality into which they were meant to live, such as endowments of reason, self-determination, moral action, personality, and relational formation.³²

Alister McGrath names some of each kind in his *Intellectuals Don't Need God and Other Modern Myths*: a sense of unsatisfied longing that results from the person being separated from her Creator; human rationality that is capable of knowing about the world and seeing the Creator through it (and, I may add, which itself begs for an explanation better than what Darwinian evolution can provide, as C.S. Lewis argued); a recognition that there are moral values which are universal; a desire for immortality; existential anxiety.³³ Dare I also add a knowledge of the existence of the true God (Rom. 1:20)?

To these we can add a sense of loneliness, a loss of hope, a sense of guilt before an invisible judge, etc. Is it any wonder that existentialism so attracted people with its emphasis on these aspects of human experience?

Francis Schaeffer employed such points of contact in the method he called “taking the roof off.”³⁴ He saw how people often espouse ideas that are at odds with what they really believe deep down. The idea of taking the roof off referred to the Christian’s task of exposing these contradictions to the person. The basis for this method is this:

No non-Christian can be consistent to the logic of his presuppositions. The reason for this is simply that a man must live in reality, and reality consists of two parts, the external world and its form, and man’s “mannishness,” including his own “mannishness.” No matter what a man may believe, he cannot change the reality of what is. . . . Non-Christian presuppositions simply do not fit into what God has made, including what man is. This being so, every man is in a place of tension. Man cannot make his own universe and then live in it.³⁵

With this as a backdrop, Schaeffer believed we begin with the points of contact built into the person:

The truth that we let in first is not a dogmatic statement of the truth of the Scriptures, but the truth of the external world and the truth of what man himself is. This is what shows him his need. The Scriptures then show him the real nature of his lostness and the answer to it. This, I am convinced, is the true order for our apologetics in the second half of the twentieth century for people living under the line of despair.³⁶

There are two ways to approach the person with a view to the image of God in man. We can address these points of contact *directly* by contrasting the secularistic view with the Christian one, as Moreland has done in *The Recalcitrant Image*. We make a case, for example, that Christianity explains rationality in a way that naturalism cannot.

Another way is to employ these points of contact *indirectly*; that is, the apologist can speak in terms of a Christian view of man, assuming the person knows what he's talking about, substituting, as it were, the Christian frame for the immanent frame without making the substitution explicit. Or, perhaps I could say, bringing to the fore the parts of the picture that reflect God's truth. This way, the points of contact are not offered as theories to be debated. This is what I meant earlier when I spoke of burrowing beneath the person's collection of formulated arguments. If we are correct about certain truths being available directly to the consciousness of persons, then the immanent frame isn't absolute. This is what Schaeffer was getting at. What he called the "mannishness of man" was readily at hand to the consciousness of the person. By having his ear tuned to seeing the contradictions between the ideas visitors to his home espoused and what they revealed in other ways that they really believed, Schaeffer was able to gently lead them to an awareness of the contradiction. Schaeffer saw this as risky business. "Pushing [the

person] towards the logic of his presuppositions is going to cause him pain,” Schaeffer wrote; “therefore, I must not push any further than I need to.”³⁷ I encourage anyone who hasn’t read this material in Schaeffer’s *The God Who Is There* (in Section IV) to do so. It is worth the time.

With either approach, direct or indirect, we are looking to awaken something in the person that will bring clearly to his awareness that there is a contradiction between the ideas he espouses and what he really believes. The indirect approach could possibly give the person more time to interact with these things internally before the point of contact itself comes under examination as a theory.

There are a few advantages to this approach. One is simply (if possible!) getting past the logjam of ideas held on a theoretical level which provide a barrier that serve to protect the person. Charles Taylor notes that “modern enlightened culture is very theory-oriented. We tend to live in our heads, trusting our disengaged understandings: of experience, of beauty . . . : even the ethical: we think that the only valid form of ethical self-direction is through rational maxims or understanding.”³⁸ If James Peters is correct, and I think he is, reason cannot function properly without the input of the heart. He believes that “we can reasonably embrace the following radical claims: first, that the proper function of reason in human life is to enable us truthfully to locate ourselves in our world and to live wisely by recognizing who we are and what our proper place is in this world; and second, that reason cannot perform this proper function apart from the guidance of the human heart.”³⁹ Again, this approach seeks to minimize the time spent in the wars of abstract ideas by taking the discussion to the core of the person with whom we’re speaking.

A second benefit is that our apologetics will be guided by our theology. It’s easy enough to unconsciously fall into allowing the objections and attitudes of opponents to control our message

and even how we go about explaining and defending our beliefs. The secularist wants us to abide by his rules, to accept his presuppositions as our own. By asking ourselves routinely, “What does God say about this person?” we are kept on track.

Third, there is a benefit I want to emphasize, namely, that this approach is better suited to evangelism since it keeps the *person* holding the beliefs in view rather than the *beliefs* themselves, and it is geared to guiding the person to deal with fundamental personal matters. It’s my contention that the primary work of apologetics is serving evangelism. When that is the goal, one might think about particular points of contact within a person that lend themselves to moving the conversation to Christ. I don’t see the point myself of a two-step apologetic, where one establishes the existence of God and then turns to the person of Christ. But I don’t want to debate the point. I think we can agree that if evangelism is the motivation, the sooner one gets to Christ in the conversation the better. Perhaps such things as conscience, an awareness of guilt, a desire for forgiveness, or the search for a reason for hope would provide a start in that direction. The main goal, though, is to put in front of a person things about his or her own nature that are connections with the true God and cannot be easily denied.

Notes

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- ¹ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2007), 18.
- ² José Casanova, "A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?" in Michael Warner, Jonathan Vanantwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, eds., *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2010), 265.
- ³ See C. John Sommerville, "Stark's age of faith argument and the secularization of things: a commentary," *Sociology of Religion* (Fall 2002); http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0SOR/is_3_63/ai_92284225/
- ⁴ Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 32, 35.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 56.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 58.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 59.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 60.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 60.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 542.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 549.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 548.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 544.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 500.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 561-62.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 562.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 563.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 550.
- ²⁶ S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple modernities," *Daedalus*; 129, 1 (Winter 2000):14.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ Peter L. Berger, ed., *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 3.
- ²⁹ José Casanova, "Are We Still Secular? Exploring the Post-Secular: Three Meanings of 'the Secular' and Their Possible Transcendence." A rough draft of a paper presented at the workshop with Jürgen Habermas at the Institute for Public Knowledge, New York University, October 22-24, 2009. See also José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective," *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8, Nos.1-2 (Spring/Summer 2006).
- ³⁰ Grace Davie, "Believing Without Belonging: Just How Secular Is Europe?" A discussion with Grace Davie at the Pew Forum's biannual Faith Angle Conference on religion, politics and public life, December 2005. <http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=97>.
- ³¹ J.P. Moreland, *The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism* (London: SCM Press, 2009), 5.
- ³² Moreland, *The Recalcitrant Imago Dei*, 4.
- ³³ Alister E. McGrath, *Intellectuals Don't Need God and Other Modern Myths* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993), 16.

³⁴ See Francis A. Schaeffer, *The God Who Is There*, 3rd ed. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), section iv.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 150.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 157.

³⁸ Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 555.

³⁹ James R. Peters, *The Logic of the Heart: Augustine, Pascal, and the Rationality of Faith* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 17.